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Abstract
To the student and practitioner of international law in the twenty-first century, the just war
ethic is clearly part of Moral Theology–binding the consciences of ethical people everywhere –but
it is not part of international law. Nevertheless, there is today a lingering flavor of the Just War
Ethic in debates about issues that are partly moral and partly political, such as: 1. the testing and
use of nuclear weapons; 2. combating terrorism; and 3. humanitarian intervention to save lives
and the human environment. None of these activities is authorized expressly in the United Nations
Charter. What is an unjust war in the twenty-first century? Use of military force in violation of
the Charter of the United Nations by a sovereign Nation State. What is a just war in the twenty-
first century? Use of military force according to the decisions of the United Nations Security
Council. All theories of international law agree on one thing: Pacta Sunt Servanda Treaties must
be observed. The Charter of the United Nations is such a Treaty.This is the voice of the Just War
Ethic in the era of the UN Charter. Only in the inherent right of self defense against armed attack
can a Nation be justified in resorting to military force, without the approval of the Security Council.
Returning to the basic question: Are there criteria of Just War in the twenty-first century? Yes.
Use of military force as directed by the Security Council –or use of military force in self defense
against an armed attack are such criteria. These are the just wars of our century and likely to
remain so until the United Nations is replaced by a world government. This Article is neither
a political endorsement of the 2003 Iraq War nor a political denunciation of decision-making at
the highest level. The question is whether international law regulated the outbreak of war by the
requirement that it be a just war. The concluding unresolved issue is whether the 2003 Iraq War
conducted by the United States and its coalition was a just war in terms of the United Nations
Charter.
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MORALITY OR LAW?
To the student and practitioner of international law in the
twenty-first century, the just war ethic is clearly part of Moral
Theology - binding the consciences of ethical people every-
where' - but it is not part of international law. Nevertheless,
there is today a lingering flavor of the Just War Ethic in debates
about issues that are partly moral and partly political, such as:
1. the testing and use of nuclear weapons;2
2. combating terrorism; and3
* John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University. Portions
of this Article were delivered on February 6, 2002 at the Natural Law Colloquium, "The
Just War Ethic," at Fordham University School of Law.
This piece is offered in memory of my friend and colleague, Professor Ludwik A.
Teclaff.
1. See generally PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1968); MICHAEL WAALZER, JUST AND UNJUST IARs; A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS (3d ed. 2000); J. Bryan Hehir, S.J., Just War Theory in a Post-Cold War
World, 20J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237 (1992);J. Bryan Hehir, S.J., Changing Challenges to the
Ethic of War, Address to Fordham Colloquium, 2002 (on file with author); YEHUDA MEL,
ZER, CONCEPTS OF JUST WAR (1975).
2. See generally HENRY KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1957);
MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN THE FIRST FIFTY
YEARS (1988);JoSEPH S. NYE, NUCLEAR ETHICS (1986); McGEORGE BUNDY ET AL., REDUC-
ING NUCLEAR DANGER (1993); GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR
WAR (1958). Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (noting that customary international law does not prohibit possession of nu-
clear weapons, although their use is regulated by the U.N. Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51,
and treaties).
3. Terrorism: the random destruction of life and property to destabilize a people
in order to compel them to change the policies of its government - became notorious
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Michael Walzer has defined terrorism as
systematic and random murder of innocent people to destroy the morale of a Nation or
class and undercut its solidarity. WALZER, supra note 1, at 197. The 1965 motion pic-
ture, THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS (Rialto Pictures 1965), directed by Gillo Pontecorvo dram-
atized the Algerian War of Independence against French colonial rule (1954-1962).
For examples of other practitioners, see TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA: A HISTORY (1973)
(discussing the Irish Republican Army); DOUGLAS PIE, VIET CONG: THE ORGANIZATION
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3. humanitarian intervention to save lives and the human
environment4
None of these activities is authorized expressly in the United Na-
tions Charter. What is an unjust war in the twenty-first century?
Use of military force in violation of the Charter of the United
Nations by a sovereign Nation State. What is a just war in the
twenty-first century? Use of military force according to the deci-
sions of the United Nations Security Council.5
All theories of international law agree on one thing: Pacta
Sunt Servanda Treaties must be observed.6 The Charter of the
AND TECHNIQUE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1966); LOUIs
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979); Lee Mees, The
Basque Peace Process, Nationalism and Political Violence, in THE MANAGEMENT OF PEACE
PROCESSES 154 (John Darby & Roger MacGinty eds. 2000) (discussing the Basques);
HOWARD M. SACHAR, HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TIME (2d
ed. 2001) (discussing the Palestinians).
4. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard Lillich ed.,
1973); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL (3d
ed. 2002); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. INT'L. L.
239 (2000).
A foretaste of the destruction of a society by political interventions occurred during
the Spanish Civil War as Stalin supported the Republic and Hitler and Mussolini sup-
ported the fascists. See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1961).
Self-determination of peoples was rejected as the reason for the break-up of mul-
ticultural Nations not part of a colonial empire. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). Until the 1971 war between West Paki-
stan and its break-away portion, East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, secession of portions of
non-colonial Nations was clearly discouraged. See Thomas Franck & Nigel Rodley, After
Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L. L. 275,
304 (1973).
Concerning humanitarian intervention, the failure of U.N. organs to criticize the
intervention of Israeli paratroopers to rescue Israeli and Western passengers held hos-
tage at Entebbe, Uganda, after the hijacking of an Air France aircraft in July 1976,
established an arguable exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. For more informa-
tion on Article 2(4), see infra note 5. The facts are reviewed in thirteen years of unsuc-
cessful litigation against the carrier. See, e.g., People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air
France v. Gilberto, 383 N.E.2d 977 (I1. 1978); Aboudjid v. Singapore Airlines Ltd. and
Gulf Aviation Ltd., 489 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1985).
5. According to the United Nations Charter, the use of force in international rela-
tions is denied to Member States. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). A monopoly of the use of
force is in the Security Council after a threshold finding of a threat to peace. Id. art. 39.
The Council has the choice of economic sanctions or military force where economic
sanctions, "... . would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate .... " Id. arts. 41-
42; see W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Charter Art. 2(4),
78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 642 (1984); see also Oscar Schacter, International Law: The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984).
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28, U.K.T.S. 58
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United Nations is such a Treaty. By means of the Charter, 191
governments including the United States have made the follow-
ing pledges to each other and thereby to all mankind:
- the pledge not to use force in international relations
(Art. 2 (4));7
- the pledge to settle disputes by peaceful means (Article
33);8
- the pledge to refer disputes not settled by peaceful
means to the Security Council (Article 37);9
- the pledge to use force only pursuant to orders of the
Security Council (Article 42);1O and
- the pledge to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council (Art. 25).11
The Charter reserves the use of military force to the Security
(1980), 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 26. Pacta sunt servanda-every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
8. See id. art. 33. Article 33 states:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means.
Id.
9. Id. art. 37. Article 37 states:
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to
settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security
Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it
shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such
terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Id.
10. Id. art. 42. Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
Id.
11. Id. art. 25. Article 25 provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the pre-
sent Charter." Id.
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Council (Article 42) 12 while it prohibits the use of force, includ-
ing military force, by individual Member States (Article 2(4)),
unless such State has suffered an armed attack, against which the
inherent right of self defense may be used (Article 51).13 This is
the voice of the Just War Ethic in the era of the UN Charter.
Only in the inherent right of self defense against armed attack
can a Nation be justified in resorting to military force, without
the approval of the Security Council.14
I. THE JUST WAR ETHIC IN HISTORY
It has long been recognized that customary international
law used the private law of the Roman Empire in Corpus Iuris
Civilis, promulgated by the Emperor Justinian in 535 A.D.,15 to
fill in the need for written authority in the Middle Ages. It is
significant that other customs of Ancient Rome concerning war-
fare - whether in the Republic or the Empire - were largely
ignored in the same period, for Rome was an ever expanding
empire for which all conquests were just wars.' 6
Medieval Just War theory can be researched most conve-
12. See id. art. 42.
13. See id. art. 51. Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. ... Id. See generally D.W.
BowET-r, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); Michael J. Glennon, Military Ac-
tion Against Terrorists Under International Law: The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'V 539
(2002).
14. "This primary responsibility [to maintain international peace] is conferred
upon the Security Council .... It is only the Security Council which can require en-
forcement by coercive action against an aggressor." Advisory Opinion on Certain Ex-
penses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 156 [hereinafter Adv. Opinion 1962]; see
Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter:
A Search for Original Intent, 3 Wvo. L. REv. 663 (2003) (describing divergence in inter-
pretation of the U.N. Charter).
15. An English translation of Corpus luris Civilis has been published by Professor
J.B. Scott in 1932 in Classics of International Law, running to 2,342 pages in English. The
Emperor Justinian appointed a committee of scholars under Tribonian, his minister of
justice to bring order out of 1,000 years of Roman jurisprudence including the legen-
dary kings, the Republic and the Emperors. See HaroldJ. Berman, The Origins of Western
Legal Science, 90 HARv. L. REv. 894, 903 (1977).
16. In Rome of the Republic (502-44 B.C.) a traditional priesthood (the fetiales)
made sacrifices and consulted the auguries to discern the will of the gods on the com-
mencement of a war, after which the senate would be authorized to declare a just war.
See Arthur Nussbaum, The Significance of Roman Law in the History of International Law,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 678 (1952); JOLOWlcz, HIsToRICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
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niently in the post-medieval legal work of the Spanish Jesuit,
Francisco Sudrez.
17
Where did Sudrez get his just war ethic? From Theology -
A question by St. Thomas Aquinas 8 in Part II of Summa Theo-
logiae -
Q - Is it always a sin to wage war?
A - No - not if there was a just cause.
Aquinas required a concurrence of three elements for a
Christian to avoid acting unjustly:
1. Orders by a superior, lawful authority by whose com-
mand the war is to be waged;
2. The attack must be due to some fault of those to be at-
tacked; and
3. The right intentions must be present to advance the
good or avoid evil.19
RoMAN LAw (2d ed. 1952); HANsJ. WOLFF, ROMAN LAw: AN HIsToRIcAL INTRODUCTION
(1978).
17. Francisco Surez, SJ. (1548-1617), born in Granada. He combined philosophy
and theology; he taught in Segovia and Valladolid, Spain before spending five years in
Rome, then returning to Spain to teach in Alcala and Salamanca, and Coimbra in Por-
tugal. SeeJohn P. Doyle, Francisco Sudrez: On Preaching the Gospel to People like the American
Indians, 15 FoRDHiAM INT'L L.J. 879 (1992). Sukirez advised King Philip II of Spain and
Pope Paul V in their controversies with modem Nations and Protestants, especially the
Church of England.
His posthumous work, De Triplici Virtute Theologica (1621), was translated by James
Brown Scott in Selections from Three Works of Sudrez (1944) in the series Classics of Interna-
tional Law.
18. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), born at the Castle of Roccasecca at Aquino near
Naples. He was educated by the Benedictines at Monte Cassino until it was closed by
the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II. He then entered the new Dominican Order
(Ordo Praedicorum, founded in 1216) at the age of 18 in 1243. A brilliant and popular
teacher, he traveled great distances to teach at the Universities of Paris, Cologne and
Rome. In 1274 he returned to Naples, where he died at age fifty. Fifty years later he
was canonized as St. Thomas Aquinas (1323) and declared Doctor of the Church in
1567.
19. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II, Second Part, Question XL.
Part II states the following:
ARTICLE I Whether it is always sinful to wage war
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary.
First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged.
For it is not the business of a private person to declare war, because he can
seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is
not the business of a private person to summon together the people, which
has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed
to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common
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Was this "international law" or the moral obligation of ethi-
cal people?
What was the international law of the medieval period in
which St. Thomas Aquinas wrote?20 There was the Holy Roman
weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful
for them to have recourse to the material sword in defending that common
weal against internal disturbances when they punish evil-doers, according to
the words of the Apostle. He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister,
an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, Romans 13:4; so too, it is their
business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal
against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority: Res-
cue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner, Psalms 81:4; and for
this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. XXii 75): "The natural order conducive
to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war
should be in the hands of these who hold the supreme authority."
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. There-
fore Augustine says (Q. X, superJos.): "Ajust war is usually described as one
that avenges wrongs, when a [N]ation or [S]tate has to be punished, for refus-
ing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what
it has seized unjustly."
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a right intention,
so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.): "True religion does not look upon as sinful
those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but
with the object of securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the
good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority,
and for ajust cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention.
Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. XXii): "The passion for inflicting harm,
the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of
revolt, the lust of power, and such things, all these are rightly condemned in
war."
Reply Obj. I. As Augustine says (Contra Faust. XXii): "To take the sword is
to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or
permission of superior or lawful authority" On the other hand, to have re-
course to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or
judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so
to speak, of God, is not to take the sword, but to use it as commissioned by
another, and so it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who
make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, but they
always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are pun-
ished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Id.
20. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS (rev. ed.
1958); Arthur Nussbaum, Symposium, Forms and Observance of Treaties in the Middle Ages
and the Early Sixteenth Century, University of California (1953); LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN; George Schwarzenberger, Inter-
national Law in Early English Practice, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 74 (1948). International
legislation for the pre-Reformation Western Christian Church was decreed at Church
Councils of bishops assembled by Popes: The Second Lateran Council (1139) of Pope
2004] THE JUST WAR ETHIC IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1871
Empire - headed by an Emperor and including many kings,
princes, dukes, and city States. Holy Roman Emperors were
often at war with the Popes and other political challengers.2 '
There were also the kingdoms outside the Holy Roman Empire,
often at war with each other and always struggling to survive in-
terminable feuds with powerful vassals.22 These kings were in
Aragon, Castile, Denmark, England, France, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden, and Russia. There was also another Holy Roman Em-
pire, the Eastern Roman Empire at Constantinople, about to be
overwhelmed by the Moslem Turks.23
The lifetime of Thomas Aquinas was a time of anarchy: civil
wars, savage feuds, and ceaseless violence. The losers in battle,
defeated prisoners, were usually sold into slavery, or blinded, or
mutilated. If they were lucky, they might be ransomed for sub-
stantial amounts of gold. It is possible that the just war ethic
would have stood out as the only bit of rationality in a world of
violence. However, Aquinas's formulation was so counter to pre-
vailing ideology, one might doubt whether the just war ethic
could have been part of the international law of the period. Did
Aquinas intend to add it to international law? We cannot be
sure.
The greatest difficulty with medieval Just War theory was its
mandate that in a struggle of two parties, only one was at fault
Innocent II forbade Christians to use the newly developed crossbow. The Third Lat-
eran Council (1179) of Pope Alexander III authorized the practice of the Truce of God
- from Wednesday evening to Monday morning each week - to prohibit fighting
whether in private feuds or public warfare, and the prohibition on selling Christians
into slavery.
21. There were seventeen popes in the twelfth century. Nine served less than four
years and five of these served only one year or less. Two long-lived, strong Popes sum-
moned the General Councils of the Church, supra note 20: Innocent 11 (1130-1143)
and Alexander II (1159-1181). The Century of Thomas Aquinas witnessed a bitter
struggle with secular rulers on the appointment of bishops (The Investiture Contro-
versy) featuring contested papal elections, rival popes, and depositions and excommu-
nications of princes, kings, and emperors, such as Henry IV at Canossa and Frederick II
(three times). The popes, as temporal rulers of portions of Central Italy, were often
absorbed in Italian politics and warfare with Moslem rulers, especially the struggle to
possess Jerusalem - there had already been five crusades before the birth of Thomas
Aquinas and there were three more before his death.
22. 1 C. W. PREVITE ORTON, THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 418-70,
507-615 (1952); 2 C. W. PREVITE ORTON, THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HIsTORY
682-820, 872-936 (1952).
23. See 3JoHN J. NORWICH, ByZANTIUM, 410-37 (1996); see also GEORGE OSTROGOR-
sKY, HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE STATE, 533-72 (1969).
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while the other was not at fault. This defies reality in many quar-
rels that become violent; rage takes over and controls the way
human beings treat one another. Yet, Sudrez said: "The idea
that a war may be just on both sides is absurd."24 While that
might have been true in 1500, it does not describe the history of
500 years of dynastic and colonial warfare - with one enormous
exception - the attack on the United States by Japan on Dec. 7,
1941. If there ever were ajust war, the Second World War was it,
despite efforts to reconstruct history to put blame for the war on
U.S. economic policy of the 1930s.25
An English author and lawyer, Richard Zouche, however ar-
gued that war may be just on both sides, 6 and this thought
would be reechoed in Grotius and the scholars of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries.
Claims of universal political authority by the Papacy and the
24. See Francisco Sudrez, De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe et Caritate, DISPUTA-
TION XIII (On War) 816-23 (1621); see also Selections From Three Works of Sudrez, in CL.s-
SICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed. 1944).
25. Japanese aggression in China in 1937 was disapproved of in America, but not
to the point of interference on behalf of China. However, Japanese militarism pushed
the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938 to encourage nationalism and expel
colonial powers (Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Netherlands) just as
war broke out in Europe by Germany against Britain and France in September 1939.
Shortly Japan signed the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, an alliance with Nazi Ger-
many and Italy followed by Japanese invasion of South China that finally produced an
American response in the form of economic sanctions: first on gasoline (July 1940)
then on steel and scrap iron (September 1940). Japan's response was the invasion of
French Indo China in July 1941. The United States then imposed an embargo on all
exports to Japan - a drastic reduction in Japan's access to petroleum that would cause
the march to an Asian empire to decelerate rapidly. The plans for attacking the United
States had been made many years before, but they were submitted and approved at an
Imperial Liaison Conference on September 3, 1941, unless the United States agreed to
modify the oil embargo. Rehearsals for the Pearl Harbor attack began immediately but
rivalry between the Army (and its seizures on the Asian Continent) and the Navy (eager
to protect its potential strength) did not permit a reasonable quid pro quo for any
effective negotiation with the United States which continued to demand Japanese with-
drawal from Indochina and China. See JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER & AL-
BERT M. CRAIG, HISTORY OF EAST ASIAN CIVILIZATION 579-612 (1965); see also JOHN To-
LAND, THE RISING SUN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1936-1945
(1970).
26. Richard Zouche (1589-1661), Regius Professor of Law at Oxford and author of
texts: ELEMENTAJURISPRUDENTIAE (1629) and Ius FECIALE ["LAW OF WAR"] (1650); ap-
pointed Judge of the High Court of Admiralty (1641) by Charles I, but deprived of
office by Cromwell (1649), and briefly restored to office by Charles 11 (1661).
Zouche wrote, "But it well may be that neither of the belligerents acts unjustly. For
none acts unjustly save he who knows that he is acting unjustly." 2 Ius FECIALE 112 (F.
Brierly trans.), in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 24.
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Holy Roman Empire were successfully challenged in the period
of the religious wars of the Reformation culminating in the dev-
astation of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648),27 the period dur-
ing which the father of modern international law, Hugo Grotius,
practiced the arts of diplomacy and wrote his understanding of
the principles of international law.28
27. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) was the last of Europe's religious wars, be-
ginning with the Defenestration of Prague and the destruction of Bohemian Protestants
at the Battle of White Mountain (1620), then moved to North Germany and Denmark
(1625-1630), then to the wars of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1630-1635) and con-
cluding with the French participation under Richelieu (1635-1640). Most of the war
was fought on German soil that was ravaged and depopulated. The Peace of Westpha-
lia, concluded after three years of negotiation, was an early example of a multilateral
treaty that operated like a constitution for Europe. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westpha-
lia, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. 20 (1948).
28. Hugo de Groot (latinized as Grotius) 1583-1645, born in Delft, Holland, stud-
ied at Leyden University as a child prodigy, was awarded a doctorate in law from the
University of Orleans at age fifteen; admitted to the bar at age sixteen and elected
"historiographer" of the States - General of Holland at age twenty. His political career
was advanced with appointment as Advocate General (1607) and Pensionary of Rotter-
dam (Executive, 1613). His vigorous support of the freedom of Holland and liberal
Calvinism brought him into conflict with the supporters of the House of Orange and its
hereditary prince, Maurice, who procured his trial and sentence to life imprisonment
on false, political charges in May 1619. Serving his first two years of prison he wrote a
law text and a religious work, but in March 1621 he escaped from prison in the false
bottom of a trunk full of books, arranged by his wife. Friends aided his flight to France
where he wrote his major treatise, Dejure Belli ac Pacis (1625). He entered the diplo-
matic service of Sweden (1634-1644) as Swedish Ambassador to France. He died after
surviving a shipwreck in the Baltic Sea and is buried in the Nieuwe Kerk in Delft. Al-
though a Calvinist, he worked with Lutherans and Roman Catholics and sought the
reconciliation of the churches in a non-ecumenical age. He published works of theol-
ogy, history and drama; his first legal work (1605), published posthumously concerned
Prize law (De Jure Praedae) and his second work (1609) concerned the Freedom of the
High Seas (De Mare Liberum).
Today, Grotius is still considered to be the father of International Law, largely be-
cause he freed the law from reliance on theology, despite his Christian principles.
While searching for the just cause of war, Grotius nevertheless stressed the necessity of a
declaration of war by a sovereign authority to justify the total exercise of power needed
to suppress the enemy.
True to the humanist studies that preceded the Eighteenth Century Enlighten-
ment, Grotius drew his examples of the proper conduct of Nations from the Greek and
Roman classics rather than current State practices.
Hugo Grotius, Dejure Belli ac Pacis (1621), is more than an analysis of the just war as
understood in a religious holocaust; the text also develops other aspects of the relations
between Nations free of the constraints of belligerency as an expansion of the contents
of the Law of Nature. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 20; see also Elem~r Balogh, The Tradi-
tional Element in Grotius' Conception of International Law, 7 N.Y.U. L.Q. 261 (1929); Hersh
Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 1 (1946);
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LirE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF GROTIUS (1969).
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II. DECLARATIONS OF WAR
By the eighteenth century, lawyers and diplomats no longer
relied on the medieval theological ethic.29 To these thinkers of
the Age of Enlightenment, a Declaration of War by one of the
belligerents prior to the start of hostilities was essential to the
justification of a war. What was the source of this requirement?
Possibly its origins can be found in medieval chivalry, the code of
honor of feudal knights that called for a formal notice or chal-
lenge before actual combat between knights could begin, or,
perhaps, as was noted earlier, in the works of Grotius. °
The custom of the Declaration of War was codified at the
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907-Convention III." 1 Ef-
29. Eighteenth century international law scholarship on international law is repre-
sented by Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767).
Wolff, from a noble family in Prussia was a polymath whose theological studies
branched into the natural sciences and then to law, was expelled from his professorship
at the University of Halle in a religious controversy, but was immediately offered a pro-
fessorship at Marburg for seventeen years before returning to the Enlightenment Court
.of the absolute ruler, Frederick the Great, where his writings included, The Law of Na-
tions Treated According to Scientific Method (1749), in which he tries to distinguish the
customary laws and the enlightenment laws of nature so that there can be a just war on
the part of both belligerents.
Vattel, from Neuchatel, Switzerland, a graduate of the University of Basel, spent
most of his career as a diplomat for the Elector of Saxony; he added practical experi-
ence to the theories of Wolff in his book, Le Droit des Gens (1758), its full title being,
"The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns." Vattel distinguishes just wars from unjust wars as a practical
matter in which the war may be just on both sides. Vattel's published work was readily
available in its French original and English translation and was widely read in the early
American Republic by Franklin, Adams, andJefferson and consulted frequently byJohn
Marshall.
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, A
HISTORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS 129 (1899); NUSSBAUM, supra note 28 (citing PIERINO
BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS (1561)). Belli (1502-1575) was a soldier,
diplomat and counselor of sovereigns. Chapters 5, 8, 10, and 11 of his treatise are
devoted to declarations of war. See PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS
(1561); see also JOHN FREDERICK MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR
FROM 1700 TO 1870 (1883) (noting ten instances of formal declarations of war in 170
years); LASsA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 229 (Hersch Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1952)
(where a declaration of war is " . . . a communication by one State to another that the
condition of peace between them has come to an end, and a condition of war has taken
its place").
31. The Second Hague Peace Conference is not intelligible without reference to
the First in 1899. During the arms race of the European alliances it became obvious to
the Russians that a boundary of 1,050 miles (1,680 kilometers) with potential enemies
like the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Turkish Empire could
not be defended effectively, especially in view of the fact that its potential allies, France
and the British Empire were hundreds of miles away, accordingly, Tsar Nicholas II
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forts to impose a twenty-four hour limitation before the declara-
tion became effective were not successful at this Conference. A
Declaration of War was observed in the First World War, al-
though the formal declaration never came as a surprise because
it was usually preceded by General Mobilization of Reserves.3 2
(1864-1918) invited all powers on August 24, 1898 to attend a conference to deal with
issues of peace and war. Twenty-seven Nations (twenty Europeans plus the United
States, Mexico, Persia, Siam, China, and Japan) attended a diplomatic conference at
the Hague, Netherlands, from May 18 to July 29, 1899. Conventions dealing with the
conduct of war (prohibition of poison gas, dum-dum (exploding) bullets, and projec-
tiles from balloons), prisoners of war, and facilitation of the arbitration of disputes by
the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, were approved.
International tensions increased thereafter as Great Britain waged a war in South
Africa with the Boer republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State where there were
suggestions of German intervention on the part of the Boers; the Boxer Rebellion in
China (1900) with the intervention of an army of European States (and the U.S.A.) to
suppress the anti-foreign "rebels"; and followed by the full-scale war between Japan and
Russia (February 1904 - September 1905) in which Russia suffered a series of disastrous
defeats on land and sea.
Even before his services as Nobel Laureate peace-maker in the Russo-Japanese War
(Conference of Portsmouth, N.H. (August 5 - September 5, 1905)), President Theo-
dore Roosevelt had proposed (October 21, 1904) a second conference to deal with new
issues and to reconsider earlier decisions. Roosevelt's 1904 suggestion did not produce
a diplomatic conference because of the ongoing war, but formal invitations to the sec-
ond conference at the Hague were sent by the Tsar and the Conference met from June
15 to October 18, 1907. Forty-five Nations attended.
The Second Hague Conference produced Thirteen Conventions. Convention III
required a declaration of war before the commencement of actual hostilities. There
were also conventions dealing with naval warfare, rights of neutrals, and rejection of the
use of force to collect contract public debts. Efforts at arms limitation and mandatory
arbitration of disputes were unsuccessful. See 2 MALLOY'S TREATIES 2259; EDMUND MOR-
RIS, THEODORE REx 312, 338-419 (2001);JosEPH H. CHOATE, THE Two HAGUE CONFER-
ENCES (1913); A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (1909); Ellery C.
Stowell, Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 2 AM. J. INT'L. L. 50 (1908).
32. Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia,
June 28, 1914 led to an expanding war because of alliances, see infra note 106:
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914;
Germany declared war on Russia, July 30, 1914;
Germany declared war on France, August 1, 1914;
Germany declared war on Belgium, August 4, 1914;
United Kingdom declared war on Germany, August 4, 1914;
Montenegro declared war on Austria-Hungary, August 5, 1914;
Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, August 6, 1914;
Serbia declared war on Germany, August 6, 1914;
Montenegro declared war on Germany, August 8, 1914;
France declared war on Austria-Hungary, August 12, 1914;
United Kingdom declared war on Austria-Hungary, August 12, 1914; Japan declared
war on Germany, August 23, 1914;
Japan declared war on Austria, August 25, 1914; and
Austria declared war on Belgium, August 28, 1914.
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The laws of war, however, were applied to the belligerents re-
gardless of the presence or absence of a declaration of war.
After the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815)," Europe survived
Thereafter, there were twenty further declarations of war before the U.S. Congress
declared war by joint resolution on Germany, April 6, 1917. [The United States had
previously declared war on the United Kingdom, June 18, 1812; Mexico, May 13, 1846,
and Spain, April 20, 1898]. A further twenty-one declarations of war occurred in 1917-
1918 before the Armistice on November 11, 1918. See Manley 0. Hudson, The Duration
of the War Between the United States and Germany, 39 HARV. L. REv. 1020 (1926).
The Institute of International Law considered the requirement of a Declaration of
War in a Report of 1906, stressing the function of the declaration as a warning that
might avert actual combat.
Convention III (1907); An English translation of the Official French provides:
Article 1. The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them
must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form ei-
ther of a reasoned declaration of war, or of an ultimatum with a conditional
declaration of war.
Article 2. The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral pow-
ers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the
receipt of a notification which may, however, be given by telegraph. Neutral
powers, nevertheless, cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly
established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.
2JAMEs B. ScoTr, THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 362-67 (1909). The
United States ratified the Convention March 10, 1908. See Hague Convention, ratified by
Senate Mar. 10, 1908, ratified by President of the United States Feb. 23, 1909, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. 539.
Interpreting customary International Law in insurance cases concerning the
United States in the Second World War, courts have held that the state of war for insur-
ance purposes began with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at 8 a.m. on December
7, 1941 and not on December 8, 1941 when the Congress declared war by joint resolu-
tion, responding to President Roosevelt's address on the "day of infamy."
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1946); Savage v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944). See generally, Edwin
Borchard, Need for Injunctive Relief as Prerequisite for Granting DeclaratoryJudgment, 56 YALE
L.J. 746 (1947); Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 38 AM.J.
INT'L. L. 19 (1944). State practices are reviewed in WILLIAM E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 377-85 (A.P. Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924).
33. This period covers a number of wars and temporary peace treaties in a confus-
ing array of treachery. After the arrest of King Louis XVI (Flight to Varennes, June
1791), Austria formed a coalition with Prussia to make war on revolutionary France.
The French Legislative Assembly declared war on Austria, April 20, 1792. After the trial
and execution of the King (January 21, 1793), the National Convention declared war
on Great Britain, Holland, and Spain (February 1, 1793). Temporary peace was made
with Prussia in 1795 and Austria, in 1797 while the war with Great Britain continued,
leading to a second coalition with Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Portugal, and Turkey
in 1798 against France. It was at this point that Napoleon seized power in France in the
Coup d'6tat of 18 Brumaire (November 9, 1799). A series of brilliant French victories
led to the temporary Peace of Amiens (May 27, 1802 - May 16, 1803). In 1805, Napo-
leon's forces crushed the coalition forces at Austerlitz, leading to another temporary
peace with Prussia and Austria, but war resumed with Russia in the lead the next year
until Napoleon's victory at Friedland, leading to the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) suspending
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almost one hundred years without a general war,3 4 although
there were ferocious wars in the Americas35 and in the struggle
for colonial empire in Asia and Africa.36 Europe, armed to the
teeth, began the First World War by a series of declarations of
war in July and August of 1914.17 The United States remained
neutral until April 6, 1917 when the United States declared war
on the German Empire.38 In justification of this "War to end all
wars," President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech of
January 8, 1918 demanded, "A general association of [N]ations
to be formed to afford mutual guaranties of political indepen-
dence and territorial integrity to great and small [S]tates
alike."39 Wilson's dream prevailed at the Peace Conference at
which the Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated
the French war with Prussia and Russia and allowing Napoleon to crush Austria, but this
would reignite war between France and Russia and Napoleon's invasion of Russia
(1812). All previous enemies resumed war with France until the allied armies entered
Paris and Napoleon abdicated (April 11, 1814). This was not the end, however, when
Napoleon returned suddenly from exile and reassembled an army for a last battle with
Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia at Waterloo (June 18, 1815).
34. The closest Europe came to a general war was the Crimean War which began
with renewed war between Russia and Turkey (October 1853), which Great Britain and
France joined, allegedly to protect Turkey (March 28, 1854 - February 1, 1856). Prussia
expanded into the German Empire in a series of wars conducted by Bismarck: Denmark
(1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870-71); and a united Italy was formed in a series
of wars: Piedmont-Sardinia against Austria (1848); Piedmont-Sardinia and France with
Austria (1859), and the new Kingdom of Italy with Austria (1866).
As a result of the Crimean War restraints on the traditional law of the sea concern-
ing privateers and neutral shipping were prepared in the 1856 Declaration of Paris,
initially among the recent belligerents. See Stockton, The Declaration of Paris, 14 Am. J.
INT'L L. 356 (1920).
35.
1) War between Brazil and Argentina (1825-1828)
2) The American Civil War (April 1861-April 1865)
3) Invasion of Mexico by France (1861-1867)
4) War of Paraguay with Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (1865-1870)
5) Peru, Ecuador, and Chile at war with Spain (1866-1871)
6) War of the Pacific between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru (1879-1884)
36. These are conveniently discussed in THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR
AFRICA: THE WHITE MAN'S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912
(1991).
37. See supra note 32.
38. Declaration of War between Germany and the United States, Apr. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 1
(1917).
39. Wilson speech of April 2, 1917 to the Joint Session of Congress. This speech
used the expression "political independence and territorial integrity" that would be a
constant component of State sovereignty and reemerge in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.
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in the Treaty of Versailles.4"
The League of Nations did not outlaw war, 41 and statesmen
of the post-war period thought that this failing could be cor-
rected by a treaty for the renunciation of aggressive war by Na-
tions, whether or not members of the League. This was accom-
plished in the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact which declared that, ".... they condemn re-
course to war ... and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy .... ",42 It would be as ineffective as the League itself in
preventing the Second World War where declarations of war
usually followed the commencement of hostilities.4" Thus, decla-
rations of war became as outmoded as the theory of the just war.
That Second World War experience brought international
law itself into disrepute-Nations could no longer be trusted to
justify their actions by declarations of self- defense and just wars.
Thus, the 1945 United Nations Charter looked to conduct, not
labels. Article 2(4), "No Nation shall use force in international
relations. ' 44 "War" was banished from the Charter. Even "inter-
national law" was almost banished.45
Returning to the basic question: Are there criteria of just
War in the twenty-first century? YES. Use of military force as
directed by the Security Council 46  _ or use of military force in
self defense against an armed attack are such criteria. 47 These
40. MARGARET MCMILLAN, PARIS 1919 (2001).
41. Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provides for meetings of
the League Council in case of war. Subsequent treaties dealt with Germany's co-bel-
ligerents. See FRANcIs PAUL WALTERS, HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952).
42. 46 Stat 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, in force July 24, 1929. In the trial of major Nazi
war criminals at Nuremberg in 1945-1946, prosecutors and even judges refer to the
waging of aggressive war in violation of Kellog-Briand. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANAT-
OMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 166, 191, 295, 580 (1992).
43. Japan began hostilities against China in 1931 in its seizure of Manchuria, estab-
lishing it as the new Nation, Manchukuo. War in China began without a declaration on
June 7, 1937. Italy began its war with Ethiopia without a declaration of war on October
3, 1935.
Germany began the invasion of Poland without a declaration of war on September
1, 1939, asserting its right of self defense. Japan began hostilities against the United
States before the declaration of war and ultimatum were received in Washington on
December 7, 1941.
44. Art. 2(4) Travaux Preparatoires.
45. The Dumbarton Oaks draft contained no references to "war" or "international
law." At the San Francisco Conference, international law was inserted in the Charter in
the Preamble and Article 1(1).
46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also infra Part III.
47. In the Falkland-Malvinas War of 1982, Great Britain reported the Argentine
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are the just wars of our century and likely to remain so until the
United Nations is replaced by a world government.
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAGES WAR
In the golden dawn of the U.N. Charter in 1945-1948, it ap-
peared that the Charter might work as had been intended with
the "Four Policemen ' 48 continuing their wartime alliance to pre-
serve international peace and security. There were indeed inci-
dents in which cooperation of the policemen appeared to ex-
ist.4 9 By 1948, however, the Cold War between the United States
and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies produced stale-
mate in most U.N. operations. °
Yet during the Cold War stalemate, a political accident cre-
ated the first opportunity for the Security Council to wage war to
preserve peace, properly called Security Council enforcement
action. 51 Mao Tse-Tung's communist victory over Chiang Kai-
Shek's nationalists in 1949 set the stage for the U.S. refusal to
abandon its wartime ally, Chiang. There followed a twenty-two
year campaign by the United States to preserve Chiang's seat on
the Security Council and in the General Assembly and denying
invasion to the Security Council immediately on April 2, 1982 when a force of 5,000
Argentines attacked the 114 British troops on the islands. Britain responded on May 21,
1982 with a task force that compelled Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982. No action
of the Security Council was taken.
48. The Four Policemen concept originated at the beginning of the Second World
War. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, AcT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 4046 (2003). It would not become the five permanent members until 1945
after the liberation of France. See id.
49. See STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 36-74 (1995).
Such incidents include:
India-Pakistan Division (1947)
Indonesia Independence (1949)
Palestine - Dissolution of British Mandate and Independence of State of Israel,
May 14, 1948 and recognition by USSR and USA on the next days.
UNRRA established in 1944.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, established by G.A. Res. 428, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
Id.
50. Exclusion of non-communists from the Czechoslovak government in February
and the Soviet Blockade of West Berlin (April 1948 - September 1949) are considered
the first actions of the Cold War. See WILLIAM J. HITCHCOCK, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE:
THE TURBULENT HISTORY OF A DIVIDED CONTINENT 1945-2002, at 94-96, 110-15 (2003).
51. Enforcement is described as a unique function of the Security Council. See
Adv. Opinion 1962, supra note 14.
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the same to Mao's government. 2 Stalin came to the support of
Mao with a campaign to paralyze the United Nations until Mao
replaced Chiang. Thus in June 1950, the Soviet Union was delib-
erately absent from the Security Council when the United States
brought the issue of North Korea's invasion of South Korea to
the Council. 53
In the absence of a veto by the Soviet Union, the Security
Council authorized the use of force against North Korea.54
While the constitutionality of this action could be challenged,55
there has been acquiescence in the incident as the first Security
Council enforcement action.
The Suez crisis of 195656 witnessed the creation of new
52. Mao's Communist forces fled Nationalist attacks by the "long March" to escape
into the wilderness in 1934-1935. Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Army and his Kuomin-
tang Political Party were in nominal control of most of the mainland until the Japanese
invasion (July 7, 1937). After the Japanese surrender, civil war between Communists
and Nationalists resumed. Aided by the USSR, the communist armies overcame the
Nationalists, aided by the United States, and the Peoples Republic of China was pro-
claimed October 1, 1949; the Nationalist evacuation of the mainland was completed by
December 8, 1949 when the Kuomintang established itself on the island of Taiwan.
53. The artificial division of Korea occurred almost accidentally in 1945 when the
Big Three met at Potsdam to plan for Soviet entry into the Japanese War by breach of
the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 1941. American troops would invade from
the south while Soviet troops would invade from the north and each would occupy its
area up to the 38th parallel. The Soviets established a communist government in its
military zone which took the name Democratic People's Republic of Korea, May 1,
1948. In the American zone, the Republic of Korea was established at the same time in
the traditional capital of Seoul under Dr. Syngman Rhee. North Korean troops invaded
South Korea on June 25, 1950 with an army of 60,000. The South Korean army was
driven out of Seoul to a limited area around Pusan in the next two months, but General
MacArthur landed a large U.S. force at Inchon on September 15, 1950 that rapidly
reoccupied South Korea and pushed into North Korea. A new war, however, began on
November 26, 1950, as United Nations forces neared the Chinese border and China
sent new armies into a war which continued until an armistice was signed on July 27,
1953.
54. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. at 4-5, UN Doc. S/1501 (1950),
of June 25, 1950, (adopted by vote of 10-0, Soviet Union absent); S.C. Res. 83, U.N.
SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950), ofJune 27, 1950, (adopted
by vote of 7-1 (Yugoslavia), Soviet Union absent, Egypt and India present, but refused to
vote). The United States was appointed to lead a unified command by S.C. Res. 84,
U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950), of July 7, 1950,
adopted by a vote of 7-0 with three absentions (Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia; Soviet
Union absent).
55. Conflicting provisions of the Charter create the problem; Article 27(3) pro-
vides for an affirmative vote of nine members "including the concurring votes of the
permanent members. .. ." while Article 30 provides the Security Council shall adopt its
own rules of procedure. Under its rules, absence and abstention are not negative votes.
56. The Suez crisis began when Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced
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methodology to deal uith non-enforcement peace-keeping be-
tween two belligerents;57 this creative diplomacy having been
necessary because of vetoes by France and the United Kingdom
on the Suez issue.58
The collapse of the new government of the former Belgian
Congo was initially referred to the Security Council on August 9,
1960"9 until Cold War tensions produced a series of crises that
paralyzed the Security Council and could have disrupted the or-
ganization permanently with the Soviet demand for a TROIKA
Secretariat to represent the communist world, the capitalist
v.,orld, and the non-aligned world.6 °
The rebirth of the original concept of the Security Council
predated the collapse of Communism when the Security Council
compelled a cease-fire in the eight-year war between Iran and
Iraq,61 but this lesson was not understood in Iraq as it prepared
to subdue and incorporate Kuwait.
The second Security Council enforcement action developed
the intention of his government to nationalize the Suez Canal, then owned by a corpo-
ration in which the majority ownership was British and French. Great Britain, France
and Israel met at Svres, France to coordinate military action to prevent this seizure.
Israel invaded Sinai on October 29, 1956. British forces were landed to secure the canal
safety on October 29, 1956, after Egypt rejected a cease fire demand. Security Council
action was vetoed by Great Britain and France, but the General Assembly was convened
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 337A, UNGAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 20 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951) of Nov. 3, 1950, to make recommendations for
the maintenance of peace.
57. The cease fire became effective November 6, 1956, and UNEF I was established
on Egyptian territory. The Egyptians demanded withdrawal of UNEF from Egyptian
soil, effective May 19, 1967. The war between Egypt and Israel resumed on June 5, 1967,
and ended six days later with Israeli forces on the banks of the Suez Canal, in the Golan
Heights of Syria and in control of Jordan's West Bank territory. A cease fire went into
effect June 10, 1967, and continued until the Yom Kippur War that began on October
6, 1973 and ended with another ceasefire on October 24, 1973.
58. It is hard to be exact about Cold War vetoes; some estimate that the Soviet
Union exercised its veto 234 times, the United States 68 times, the United Kingdom 30
times, France 18 times, and China 3 times. Threats of veto often led to the withdrawal
of proposals.
59. The Belgian Congo, a colony since 1908, became independentJune 30, 1960.
Civic disturbances and army mutiny caused foreigners to flee widespread violence.
60. The death of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in a plane crash occurred
on September 17, 1961 en route to meetings with the belligerents in the Congo.
61. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (1982-1992) first determined that
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union saw any Cold War implications in an
end to the eight year war, begun by Iraq on September 22, 1980. The Security Council
ordered a cease fire on August 20, 1988.
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when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.62 The same day,
the Security Council denounced the invasion and demanded
that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally. 6 A cas-
cade of economic sanctions over the next four months did not
produce Iraqi withdrawal.64 Accordingly, the Security Council
authorized the use of force to compel Iraqi withdrawal.65
The successful liberation of Kuwait in 1991 should have pro-
duced repetitive enforcement actions whenever international
peace and security were threatened. It did not. Freed from ac-
tual communist vetoes, the Security Council operated under the
threat of vetoes, making the Security Council a virtual copy of
the General Assembly where business is done through consensus
resolutions. 66 The Security Council cannot claim that it pre-
served international peace and security in Bosnia,6 7 Somalia,6"
62. The invasion had been preceded by unfruitful negotiations between Iraq and
Kuwait concerning oil-drilling activities in the unmarked border region.
63. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/660
(1990). The vote was 14 in favor, 0 opposed, 1 abstention (Yemen).
64. S.C. Res 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2933 (1990),
of Aug. 6, 1990, the vote was 13-0 with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen); S.C. Res 662,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/662 (1990), of Aug. 9, 1990, the
vote was 15-0. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/664
(1990), of Aug 18, 1990, the vote was 15-0; S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/665 (1990), of Aug. 25, 1990, the vote was 13-0 with 2 absten-
tions (Cuba and Yemen). S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/666 (1990), of Sept. 13, 1990, the vote was 13-2 (Cuba and Yemen); S.C. Res.
667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/667 (1990), of Sept. 16,
1990, the vote was 15-0; S.C. Res. 669, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
Res/669 (1990), of Sept. 24, 1990, the vote was 15-0; S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2943rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/670 (1990), of Sept. 25, 1990, the vote was 14-1
(Cuba); S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/674
(1990), of Oct. 29, 1990, the vote was 13-0 with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen).
65. S.C. Res. 678 U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990),
of Nov. 29, 1990; the vote was 12 in favor, 2 opposed (Cuba and Yemen) and 1 absten-
tion (China). See Burns H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations
Law, Continued: Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making Precarious
Legitimacy, 85 AM.J. INT'L. L. 516 (1991).
66. Consensus resolutions in the General Assembly became customary after 1965
because of the effect of Article 19 of the Charter depriving States, delinquent in paying
their assessed contributions, of their votes in the General Assembly. Even after an Advi-
sory Opinion, supra note 14, determined that the UNEF and UNOC operations were
proper expenses of the United Nations, France and the Soviet Union, two permanent
members of the Security Council, indicated they would continue to refuse to pay these
assessments. (Article 19 does not affect votes in the Security Council). For a critique of
the Council, see Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AlT.,
May-June 2003, at 16 (2003).
67. Bosnia (UNPROFOR) S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N.
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Rwanda,69 and Kosovo," where violence went unrestrained by
the Council. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, a response to the
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington by ter-
rorists, met the modern 'Just War" criteria of self-defense and
Security Council authorization.7 1 However, the wisdom and le-
gality of the 2003 war against Iraq is being judged in a different
context - the inaction of a politically divided Security Council.
IV. REHEARSAL FOR IRAQ: KOSOVO AND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
The 2003 uses of force against Iraq and the 1999 uses of
force against Serbia because of Kosovo are, in some ways, similar.
Two months of air war against Serbia by NATO forces led by the
United States (MarchJune 1999) were followed by the occupa-
tion of Kosovo by NATO forces to separate the Yugoslav and
Kosovar armies. Four years later, two months of air and ground
war against Iraq by "coalition" forces led by the United States
(March-May 2003) brought an end to battlefield warfare, but not
to sudden death and injury to soldiers and civilians. Differences
based on history exist as well: an all-Muslim State in Iraq and a
Doc. S/RES/743 (1992), of Feb. 21, 1992, adopted by a vote of 15-0; (UNMIBH) S.C.
Res. 1035, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3613th mtg. P 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995), of
Dec. 21, 1995, adopted by a vote of 15-0. See infra notes 84-88.
68. Somalia (UNOSOM I) S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 3069th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (1992), of Apr. 24, 1992, adopted by a vote of 15-0; (UNOSOM II) S.C. Res.
814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993), of Mar. 26,
1993, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
69. Rwanda S.C. Res. 812, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3183rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
812 (1993), of Mar. 12, 1993, adopted by a vote of 15-0; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), of May 25, 1993; S.C. Res. 872,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993), of Oct. 5, 1993, and
S.C. Res. 955, of Nov. 8, 1994.
70. Kosovo S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1160 (1998), of Mar. 31, 1998; S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998), of Sept. 23, 1998; S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1203 (1998), of Oct. 24, 1998; S.C. Res. 1244, U.N.
SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), ofJune 10, 1999. SeeJules
Lobel, American Hegemony and International Law: Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Art. 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 19 (2000); see also Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law
of "Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999). See infra notes 90-100.
71. S.C. Res. 1368 of Sept. 12, 2001, adopted by a vote of 15-0. G.A. Res. 56/1, of
Sept. 12, 2001. S.C. Res. 1373, of Sept. 28, 2001, adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res.
1378, of Nov. 14, 2001, adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res. 1383, of Dec. 6, 2001,
adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res. 1386, of Dec. 20, 2001, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
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multi-ethnic Balkan region cursed by religious, linguistic, and
cultural differences.
Security Council ineptitude may be listed as the reason for
NATO's use of force, but this is only partially correct. Kosovo
must be seen against centuries of Balkan horrors and ten years
of world-wide frustration at the actions of the Serb and Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic, belatedly and unexpectedly sup-
ported by Russia's failed leader, Boris Yeltsin.
Russia became an important part of Balkan problems in the
nineteenth century, as protector of Orthodox Christian Slavs to
prevent Islamic Turkey from reasserting the claims of sixteenth
century conquests72 and to prevent Roman Catholic Austria-
Hungary from expanding its empire deeper into the Balkans.73
In fact, Russian moves to protect Serbia after the assassination of
the heir to the thrones of Austria-Hungary by a Serb in 1914
began the chain reaction of alliances that produced the First
World War.74
In the deep background was the creation in 1918 of an arti-
ficial union of various Balkan peoples, mutually antagonistic at
least, but prone to ethnic violence: murder, rape, torture, and
destruction. After the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire at the end of the First World War, the victorious allies en-
couraged the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes under the royal house of Serbia.75 (Serbs and Croats
speak the same language, but it is spelled in the Cyrillic alphabet
in Serbia and in the Latin alphabet in Croatia). The kingdom
was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929; but ethnic tensions persisted,
driven by religion: the Orthodox serbs versus the Roman Catho-
lic Croats and a substantial Muslim population inherited from
72. While there was an intellectual movement known as Pan-Slavism, it does not
appear to have affected foreign policy. Russia fought eleven wars with Turkey between
1677 and 1918. See NICHOLAS V. RASANovsKv, A HISTORY OF RUsSIA 428-64 (1963);
HUGH SETON-WATSON, THE RUSSIAN EMPiRE 1801-1917, at 445-60, 686-98 (1967).
73. Turkey's enfeebled sultanate lost control over the non-Turkish parts of the
Balkans in the nineteenth century as Orthodox and Slavic nationalism advanced. Aus-
tria-Hungary advanced from its base in Croatia and acquired virtual control in Bosnia
by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina out-
right in 1908. See EDWARD CRAN.~sHAw, THE HAPSBURGS 251-59 (1971).
74. The assassination of the Austrian heir, Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sara-
jevo, Bosnia, by a Serb on June 28, 1914 began the rush to the First World War. See
supra note 32.
75. MCMILLAN, supra note 40, at 109-24.
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five hundred years of Turkish rule.7 6
During the Nazi occupation of 1941-1945 there was a civil
war between Tito's "partisans," mostly Serb communists (al-
though Tito, Josip Broz, was a Croat) and the "Chetniks" of
Draja Mikhailovic, largely Croat. Furthermore, there was also ac-
tive collaboration with the Nazis by a Croat regime led by Ante
Pavelic, leader of the Ustashe [Revolutionary] Party. The Nazis
broke up pre-war Yugoslavia, awarding portions to their allies;
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, and German-annexed Aus-
tria.77
At the end of the Second World War, Marshall Tito was in
firm control of the country; the monarchy was abolished and a
new federal Nation of six constituent republics (Slovenia, Croa-
tia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia),
was established in 1946 under communist control with Serbs the
largest ethnic group in the federal union.78
After Tito's death in May 1980, a collective leadership suc-
ceeded, alternating the presidency between the constituent re-
publics. A new Serb strongman, Slobodan Milosevic, gradually
emerged along with a fiery Serb nationalism seeking to establish
a "Greater Serbia" cleansed of non-Serb populations.79
Even under Tito, Yugoslavia did not respond to every de-
mand of Stalin and his successors and Yugoslavia developed its
own brand of socialism until the supremacy of the Communist
Party ended in January 1990, seventeen months before the col-
lapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. Without the
compulsive force of Communist centralization, Slovenia and
Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, and the So-
viet Union broke up in December 1991 as the independence of
the sixteen Soviet republics was recognized.8 °
The Yugoslav Army attempted to prevent the secession of
Slovenia, unsuccessfully, and threatened to use force against
76. Interwar Yugoslavia was given memorable treatment by the late Rebecca West
in BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: AJouRNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA (1941).
77. Croatia's short-lived independence was recognized by Nazi Germany and its
allies. The Nazis awarded Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, but gave the Dalmatian coast
to Italy.
78. THE CREATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1914-1918 (Dimitrije Djordjevic ed., 1980).
79. LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LIVrLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1997).
80. See DAVID REMNICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE
(1993); see also MICHAEL BESCHLOSS & STROBE TALBOTr, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS (1993).
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Croatia, but the European Union persuaded the parties to agree
to a cease fire on August 31, 1991.81 Slovenia and Croatia be-
came members of the United Nations on May 22, 1992.
While independence of Slovenia was achieved with little vio-
lence, Croatian independence had occurred after a long period
of Croat terrorism against federal'Yugoslavia.82 The 1991 E.U.
cease fire did not hold in Croatia as Serbs sought to join a por-
tion of Croatia (Krajina) to a greater Serbia. Civil war, aided by
Serbia, continued in 1993 and 1994 until Croats regained con-
trol of Serb-occupied portions of Croatia.13
It was in the background of the Serb-Croat war in Croatia
that Bosnia-Herzegovina ("Bosnia") sought independence by a
referendum on February 29, 1992. A series of violent confronta-
tions between the three ethnic components of the province de-
veloped.84 A full civil war began in 1992 with "ethnic cleansing"
of Moslems by Serbs and genocidal massacres of Moslems and a
Serb siege of the capital Sarajevo. 5 The European Union and
the United States recognized the new Bosnian republic on April
7, 1992. Bosnia became a member o the United Nations on May
81. European Union (formerly European Community). Slovenian independence
is discussed in SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 79, at 105-18, 154-69.
82. See generally MARcus TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR 276-98 (2d
ed. 2001).
83. The Security Council made a threshold finding of threat to the peace in Yugo-
slavia in S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991), of Sept. 25, 1991, adopted by a vote of 15-0. Yugoslavia requested a peace-
keeping operation on November 26, 1991, to authorize a peace-keeping force as soon
as peace could be restored. The Security Council established the interim peace-keep-
ing force (UNPROFOR) by S.C. Res. 743, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
743 (1992), of Feb. 21, 1992, adopted by a vote of 15-0. UNPROFOR's mandate was
renewed by S.C. Res. 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/871
(1993), of Oct. 4, 1993, and S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3434th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/947 (1994), of Sept. 30, 1994. Thereafter UNPROFOR was replaced by
UNCRO (United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia) by S.C. Res.
981, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3512th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 (1995), of Mar. 31,
1995, adopted by a vote of 15-0. UNCRO's functions were to separate the hostile forces,
supervise the ceasefire, and facilitate humanitarian assistance. Further Security Council
Resolutions concerned specific areas where demilitarization was necessary after the
withdrawal of UNCRO. See S.C. Res. 1037, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3619th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1037 (1996), of Jan. 15, 1996, adopted by a vote of 15-0. For the Croat
war, see SILBER & LIrrLE, supra note 79, at 134-53, 169-204.
84. Bosnia's population of four million is approximately 40% Serb, 38% Muslim,
and 22% Croat. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2003, at 765 (William A.
McGeveren, Jr. ed., 2003).
85. Sieges of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Gorazde occurred during this time period.
The Bosnia war is discussed in SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 79, at 222-75.
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22, 1992, and the rump of former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) was denied the membership formerly held by Yugoslavia
in the United Nations by General Assembly Resolution 47/1,86
thereby effectively expelling Yugoslavia and requiring the rump
Nation to apply for membership.
Civil war between Moslems and Croats in Bosnia was re-
solved by a cease fire on February 23, 1994. These groups
patched together an agreement to form a single autonomous
federal State, an important step towards the eventual reunifica-
tion of Bosnia, but Serb warfare against Moslems and Croats was
highly successful at this time, aided by the Serb remnant of Yugo-
slavia, and Serb forces occupied much of Bosnia.8 7
E.U. efforts at peace-keeping could not possibly succeed as
long as Serb sieges of Sarajevo and supposedly safe areas contin-
ued. Peace-making would have to take the place of peace-keep-
ing and this function was assumed by NATO which threatened to
use force against Bosnian Serb forces to make peace. En-
couraged by Serbia to persevere there was no move by the Serbs
to end the fighting until NATO began air attacks on Bosnian
Serb forces at the end of August 1995.8 Several weeks of
NATO's air war produced proposals for peace talks which were
86. See G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/1 (1992).
87. The Security Council had recognized the threat to peace in the region (see
supra note 83 and accompanying text) and ordered that safe-haven areas be established
in places of heavy fighting by S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/819 (1993), of Apr. 16, 1993, and S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993), of May 6, 1993, both adopted unanimously,
but decided to take action under U.N. Charter Chapter VII in S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR
48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/836 (1993), of June 4, 1993, adopted by a
vote of 13-0 with 2 abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuela), having become alarmed at the
grave and intolerable situation; gravely concerned with Serb unwillingness to accept
peace proposals and condemning Serb obstruction to humanitarian relief. The Secur-
ity Council decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR to protect safe areas and
ensure humanitarian relief by "... necessary measures, including the use of force ...
including close air support." U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/871
(1993).
Finally, after the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Security Council created a civilian
police force (UNMIBH) after UNPROFOR was withdrawn by S.C. Res. 1035, 50th Sess.,
3613th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995), of Dec. 21, 1995, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
88. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 79, at 311-63. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR 48th
Sess., 3228th mtg., 10, U.N. DOC. S/RES/836 (1993) decides that: "Member States,
acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under
the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secre-
tary General and the Force, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and
around the safe areas .
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held at Dayton, Ohio, leading to an agreement on November 21,
1995, achieved by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to end
the war and reconstitute Bosnia as a federal Nation. With peace
achieved, peace-keeping again became possible and 60,000
NATO troops ("IFOR" or "Implementation Force") moved into
Bosnia to separate the armies and attempt to return or relocate
thousands of refugees.8 9
It was in this 1991-1995 period that allegations of "ethnic
cleansing," war crimes, and genocide were made and proven.
Accordingly, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, established an International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") by S.C. Res. 827.90 The Tribunal be-
gan its work at the Hague with indictments for war crimes and
crimes against humanity by October 1994. The Tribunal did not
appear to be able to deal effectively with the Serbian atrocities
until Serbia surrendered its former president, Milosevic on June
28, 2001.
Just as it seemed that violence in the former Yugoslavia had
ended, and United Nations sanctions were lifted, a new war be-
gan in the southern part of Serbia, Kosovo, which had been an
autonomous part of Serbia in the Yugoslav federation.91 While
Serbs regard Kosovo as the Serb homeland, they had ceased to
live there in large numbers and the inhabitants were mostly Al-
banians, divided by religion into Moslems, Orthodox, and Ro-
man Catholic communities. In 1989, Serbia removed the auton-
omous status of Kosovo and began direct rule.9 2 Kosovo Albani-
89. See S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/836
(1993). For a discussion of the Dayton talks see SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 79, at 364-
79. The Implementation Force ("IFOR") was established by S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR
50th Sess., 3607th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/4031 (1995), of Dec. 15, 1995, by a vote of
15-0. That resolution authorized IFOR to take "all necessary measures" to keep the
fragile peace. Id.
90. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/827
(1993), of May 25, 1993, adopted by a vote of 15-0. The resolution notes flagrant viola-
tions of humanitarian law: " . . . mass killings, massive, organized and systematic deten-
tion and rape of women, and the continuance of the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'...."
Id.
91. Resolving ethnic conflict within a multi-cultural State by creation of an autono-
mous unit within the State was a technique of the League of Nations in the Aland
Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1920. See generally NOEL MALCOLM, Ko-
sovo: A SHORT HISTORY 334-56 (1999).
92. See GREG CAMPBELL, THE ROAD TO Kosovo: A BALKAN DIARY (1999) (discussing
the Serb elimination of autonomy).
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ans responded by a declaration of independence in July 1990,"3
just before Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia declared
their independence. Yugoslavia responded with military force
and civil war between the Yugoslavs and Kosovo Albanians be-
came a reality.
The Kosovo Liberation Army was organized to protect Alba-
nian communities and began a direct challenge to Serb forces in
1997. It soon appeared that ethnic cleansing of Albanians (espe-
cially Moslems) was recurring in Kosovo as it had earlier in Bos-
nia. Full scale war with charges and counter-charges of genocide
and war crimes raised the issue of United Nations involvement in
the peace-making process. 4
The possibility of renewed use of force against Serbia pro-
voked Russia to threaten to veto United Nations enforcement
action. Thus, the first Kosovo resolution of the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII, imposed an embargo on the sale or
supply of weapons to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but
no interposition of United Nations forces. The action
paragraphs "call upon" both sides to do something almost im-
possible: Serbia to resolve its problems with Kosovars by means
of unacceptable proposals made by a powerful group of States
(France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United States, and United King-
dom); the Kosovars to reject all forms of terrorism and to pursue
their goals only through peaceful means.95
The next year (1998) the Security Council tried again to be-
come involved in the Kosovo civil war by demanding a cease-fire
and decided, "to consider further action and additional mea-
sures" if a political solution cannot be achieved.96 No steps for a
political solution were taken and the violence continued, so
NATO threatened to take collective action to fulfill S.C. Res.
93. Kosovar Independence is not a goal of the United Nations.
94. See ANDREWJ. BACEVICH & ELIOT A. COHEN, WAR OVER Kosovo: POLITICS AND
STRATEGY IN A GLOBAL AGE (2001); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The U. N., NATO and Interna-
tional Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000). For a view of the Kosovo war as a
healthy development, expressed by the former Legal Adviser to the State Department,
see Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
95. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/1160
(1998), of Mar. 31, 1998, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
96. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/1199
(1998), of Sept. 23, 1998, adopted by a vote of 15-0. For further discussion on S.C. Res.
1199, see infra note 102. The resolution contained sixteen paragraphs of demands and
warnings to Yugoslavia.
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1199. But NATO also did nothing immediately while both sides
continued the violence and Albanians fled. Peace talks on Ko-
sovo resumed in a desultory fashion in the new year (1999),
while threats of renewed force against Saddam Hussein in Iraq
were circulated by the United Kingdom and the United States.
As in Bosnia in 1995, NATO air power began an air war over
Serbia on March 24, 1999 without a specific Security Council res-
olution authorizing use of force, but suggesting that it was a hu-
manitarian intervention possibly authorized by S.C. Res. 1199.
There had been an escalation of violence in the ground war by
Serbia, causing more Albanians to flee across the borders to Al-
bania or Macedonia.
Questions of the legality of the use of force became part of
the tragedy of Kosovo as the Milosevic government of Serbia be-
gan law suits in the International Court of Justice against ten of
the then sixteen NATO Member Nations, alleging illegal use of
force in violation of the United Nations Charter, Article 2(4),
and the 1949 Genocide Convention.9 7 Under Article 38 of the
Statute of the ICJ, the court had no compulsory jurisdiction over
the United States98 and Spain. Belgium filed an answer sug-
gesting justification for the use of force as a humanitarian inter-
vention.9 9 The future of this litigation is uncertain; brought by
Milosevic in the name of Serbia just before Milosevic was de-
feated for reelection and handed over to the International Tri-
bunal, it is doubtful that Serbia, now again a member of the
United Nations, will pursue it with the zeal it demands. This
would obviously be a good time for the ICJ to interpret Articles
2(4) and 51 of the Charter, in the context of a humanitarian
tragedy.
Another unusual legal maneuver after the beginning of
NATO's war against Serbia was the resolution proposed by Rus-
sia in the Security Council for a condemnation of the NATO air
war as a threat to peace and a violation of the Charter.100 The
97. Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal and United Kingdom, 1999 I.CJ.
98. See Letter from George Schultz, former U.S. Secretary of State, to Perez de
Cuellar, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985) (concerning
the International Court of Justice).
99. Belgium responsive pleading, dated July 5, 2000, a 120 page document.
100. See JOHN NoRIs, COLLISION COURSE: NATO, RUSSIA AND Kosovo (2004);
HALL GARDNER, DANGEROUS CROSSROADS: EUROPE, RUSSIA AND THE FUTURE OF NATO
(1997).
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resolution failed on a vote of 3 to 12 (vetoes by France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). The positive votes
were those of China, Namibia, and Russia. This Russian maneu-
ver is at least unusual. A physically and morally weakened Yeltsin
had to deal with a Russian army humiliated by civil war in
Chechnaya, a collapsing economy which had defaulted on its
debts and the uncertain future of Russia's relations to NATO
which would shortly expand to the borders of the former Soviet
Union in Byelorussia (Belarus) and Ukraine.
Nothing stopped the war - seventy-eight days of air assault
on Serbia's military and industrial capacity. Milosevic could no
longer sacrifice his people to the demands of Greater Serbia and
byJune 10, 1999, Serbia acceded to NATO's demands, including
Kosovo Force ("KFOR"), a force of 50,000 NATO troops to ob-
serve the demilitarization of Kosovo and the return of the Alba-
nian Kosovars to their ravaged homes.'0 '
Certainly S.C. Res. 1199 comes very close to authorizing the
use of force by its demand of "further action" and it is a source
of wonder that it did not provoke vetoes by Russia and China.1 0 2
The effect of NATO's Kosovo War as regional self-defense,
humanitarian intervention, or anticipatory self-defense is un-
clear; the words of Secretary General Kofi Annan were not de-
nunciatory, merely mysterious in his remarks: "[N]ormally a
U.N. Security Council Resolution is required.""1 3
V. THE IRAQ WAR OF MARCH-APRIL 2003
One year after the attacks on New York and Washington,
and during the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghani-
stan, the President of the United States addressed the General
Assembly of the United Nations on September 12, 2002, de-
manding that the Security Council enforce its resolutions against
101. See MALCOLM, supra note 91. See also S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4011 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), of June 10, 1999 (providing for KFOR in a
lengthy resolution). Annex 2, paragraph 4 of this resolution noted that: "The interna-
tional security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participa-
tion must be deployed under unified command and control . . . ." Id. at ann. 2(4).
102. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(1998), of Sept. 23, 1998, adopted by a vote of 15-0. S.C. Res. 1199, paragraph 16 states:
"Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution
1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to main-
tain or restore peace and stability in the region .. . ." Id. at 116.
103. O'Connell, supra note 94 (quoting Secretary General Kofi Annan).
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Iraq."' 4 The speech also threatened "unavoidable action" if Se-
curity Council resolutions were ignored. 0 5
Congress supported the threat of action on October 16,
2002, authorizing use of United States Armed Forces ".... to de-
fend the national security of the United States against the con-
tinuing threat posed by Iraq .... "106
It is uncertain which Security Council Resolutions were in-
tended. Clearly there were at least twenty-eight Security Council
resolutions beginning on August 2, 1990 that might have been
involved, although the continuing validity of some might be
challenged."0 7
Interpreting U.S. complaints as demanding exclusively the
disarming of Iraq and removing "Weapons of Mass Destruction"
("WMD"), the Security Council adopted S.C. Resolution 1441
unanimously on November 9, 2002, offering a "final opportu-
nity" to disarm, requiring a new effort at international inspection
for weapons and demanding a complete history of all Iraqi ef-
forts to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and
ballistic missiles.' 0 8
Disagreement as to the results of the inspections and the
completeness of Iraq's Report demonstrated a split in the unity
of the Security Council. The United States assisted by the
United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia sought authorization for
the use of force against Iraq to compel disarmament (also a
change of regime). Momentarily setting aside potential vetoes
by France, Russia, and China, there did not seem to be the nine
affirmative votes to mandate the use of force, thus the issue was
taken out of its proper legal context and politicized.
104. President George W. Bush, THREATS AND RESPONSES: In Bush's Words: On
Iraq, U.N. Must Face Up to Its Founding Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A1O.
105. Id.
106. Authorization For Use Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
107. See Davis Brown, Enforcing Arms Control Agreements by Military Force: Iraq and an
800 Pound Gorilla, 26 HAS-NGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 159 (2003); see also Sean D.
Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 470, 471 (1992).
108. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1441 (2002), of Nov. 8, 2002, adopted by a vote of 15-0; see also infra notes 134-36. The
record of Iraqi deception and defiance on disarmament can be reviewed in HANS BLIX,
DISARMING IRAQ 215-75 (2004).
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The United States delivered an ultimatum1"9 to Iraq that
President Saddam Hussein and his two sons (Qusay and Uday)
must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. No positive response
was received. Accordingly, U.S. forces, assisted by a coalition of
others - chiefly the United Kingdom - began an invasion and
an air attack on Iraq on March 20, 2003. a10 The military cam-
paign was swiftly concluded and largely complete against organ-
ized resistance by May 1, 2003, when an end to major combat
activity in Iraq was proclaimed by the President of the United
States. This was hardly the end of war; death and casualties as
gun battles and explosions continue even after the capture of
former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003.
The argument against lawfulness of the U.S. invasion re-
quires a tabula rasa [a clean slate] free of any previous history or
relationship between Iraq and the United States. In that con-
text, the United States used force in international relations to
compel a change of regime in Iraq, without the Charter method
to legitimize that use of force which would have been a new Se-
curity Council resolution under Article 42 to enforce compli-
ance with previous Security Council resolutions."' 1
In the absence of a 2003 Security Council Resolution, newly
authorizing military force, the other alternative in this clean
slate scenario is the inherent right of self- defense under Article
51, but that authority requires an armed attack by Iraq. Without
an armed attack, can possession of weapons of mass destruction
qualify as armed attack or an imminent threat of attack?
Here we confront the central ambiguity of Article 51. The
inherent right of self-defense in customary international law
109. President George W. Bush, THREATS AND RESPONSES; Bush's Speech on Iraq:
'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A14.
110. Elisabeth Bumiller & DavidJohnston, A NATION AT WAR- BAGHDAD; Surprise
Strike at Outset Leaves Urgent Mystery: Who Was Hit?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at Al. Two
thousand bombs and forty cruise missiles were used the first day of combat. See id. The
"coalition" forces are made up of contributions in men and materiel from thirty-six
members of the United Nations. According to globalsecurity.org, Nations contributing
more than 500 personnel were: United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Ukraine,
Spain, Netherlands, Australia, Republic of Korea, Romania, and Japan. See also Anne
Wickersham, A Week at War, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 2003, at A9.
111. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990). S.C. Res. 678 of November 29, 1990 authorized the use of military force. See id.
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), of
April 3, 1991, imposed a conditional cease fire. See also infra notes 122-27.
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must have included anticipatory self- defense,' 12 yet the require-
ment of an armed attack in the U.N. Charter implies a suicidal
wait for a nuclear first strike that might obliterate the means of
defense. While the International Court of Justice has not con-
strued Article 51, there are Security Council opinions and deci-
sions that clearly reject the idea of anticipatory self-defense. 113
U.N. law does not permit the preemptive strike favored in cur-
rent U.S. thinking, and it remains to be seen whether the Secur-
ity Council will endorse the Iraq invasion retroactively in the
same way as the Kosovo bombings were sanitized.' 1 4
A further difficulty for those who propose retroactive ap-
proval of military force is the apparent requirement in Article 42
itself that there must be proof that economic sanctions have
failed before military force is used - a questionable interpreta-
tion that might frustrate international security. In the absence
of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it is doubtful that eco-
nomic sanctions to force disarmament could have failed to pro-
duce disarmament.
In contrast, to the tabula rasa or clean slate, scenario, how-
ever, is the cascade of Security Council resolutions from 660 to
112. The Caroline Affair of December 29, 1837 led to a serious crisis between the
United States and the United Kingdom when a British military expedition entered the
United States at Niagara Falls during an uprising in Canada in order to destroy an
American vessel chartered by Canadian rebels. Self defense was argued by the United
Kingdom but was refuted by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster who responded to
British assertions that ". . . exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense do
exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 'necessity of that self-
defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.'" 2JOHN BASSErr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 409-14 (1906).
113. In Nicaragua v. United States, the Court had refused to expand the case to
include Honduras and El Salvador. See 1986 I.CJ. 4 (1986). Accordingly, the Vanden-
berg Reservation to the U.S. Consent to jurisdiction of the Court prevented a considera-
tion of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American
States.
S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981),
of June 19, 1981 (Ossirac); S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/573 (1985), of Oct. 4, 1985 (Tunis); and S.C. Res. 517, U.N. SCOR, 37th
Sess., 2389th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/517 (1982), of Aug. 4, 1982 (Lebanon) condemn
anticipatory self-defense assertions by Israel.
114. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1244 (1999), ofJune 10, 1999. A step towards nunc pro tunc was taken in S.C. Res. 1483,
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) of May 22, 2003,
adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Syria absent), a clear recognition of the consequences of the
use of force against Iraq. See Richard A. Falk, What Future for the United Nations Charter
System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 590 (2003); see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
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1441 on Iraq. In considering each of these, the question is
whether a resolution has expired by specific termination date or
because its purpose has been fully achieved. 115 Beyond these
types of deliberate terminations, are resolutions "calling upon"
or "demanding" certain conduct, for which Security Council si-
lence about termination is ambiguous. It may be argued that the
passage of time alone terminates the effectiveness of resolutions.
On the other hand, it can be argued that having not provided
for termination, the Security Council had no intent on termina-
tion whatsoever and was content to allow the situation to develop
in a manner to be determined later by the Council, having re-
tained jurisdiction of the issue.
To understand the flood of resolutions on Iraq, it is neces-
sary to return to the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Security Council
Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990 contained the Council's
threshold finding of threat to international peace and security
by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and demanded Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait immediately.' 16 When there had been no immedi-
ate Iraqi withdrawal, resolutions under Article 41 imposed and
enforced economic sanctions on Iraq.117 Thereafter the Security
Council cited its Chapter VII authority, thus imposing compli-
ance by all members, pursuant to Article 48.11 Resolution 661
established a Special Committee to regulate the embargo on ex-
ports and imports imposed therein and a freezing of Iraqi as-
115. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that mea-
sures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate
....1).
116. Expiration dates are rarely used, but terminations may be implied from con-
ditions dependent on "if," "until," or similar words. Cf S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR 50th
Sess., 3607th mtg., at 19, U.N. DOC. S/RES/4031 (1995), of Dec. 15, 1995 (terminat-
ing the authority of previous resolutions when IFOR replaced UNPROFOR). The Se-
curity Council has also imposed time limits on certain actions, see S.C. Res. 954, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3447th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/954 (1994), of Nov. 4, 1994 (terminat-
ing the Somalia Mission on March 31, 1995).
117. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/660
(1990), of Aug. 2, 1990, adopted by vote of 14-0 (Yemen abstained). The Council in-
voked its Chapter VII powers by the words, "Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the
Charter ...." Shaw J. Dallal, International Law and the United Nations Role in the Gulf
Crisis, 18 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L. L. & COM. 111 (1993).
118. See U.N. CHARTER art. 48(1). The action required to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be
taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine.
1896 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1865
sets. 19 Resolution 662 nullifies Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.
120
Resolution 665 authorizes the use of force to halt all Iraqi ship-
ments inward or outward.' 2 ' Resolution 666 provides an human-
itarian exception for imports, and Resolutions 667 and 674 pro-
tect diplomats accredited to Kuwait.1 22 None of these resolu-
tions had a time limit except Resolution 674 which notes that
the Council will, "remain actively and permanently seized of the
matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace
has been restored .... "123
The crucial Resolution 678124 moves from Article 41 author-
ity to Article 42, use of military force, in the broadest possible
terms, use of "all necessary means." 125 Instead of the predicted
"mother of battles" the First Gulf War began with a devastating
air attack and quickly concluded with a ground offensive of four
days that produced a preliminary cessation of the allied attack in
Resolution 686 of March 2, 1991.126
There followed a second conditional cease fire Resolution
(S.C. Res. 687)127 to impose an effective end of Iraq's presence
in Kuwait and the effective disarmament of Iraq so as to remove
Iraq's threat to its neighbors. This complex resolution, in nine
119. See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990), of Aug. 6, 1990, adopted by a vote of 13-0 (Cuba and Yemen abstaining).
120. See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(1990) of Aug. 9, 1990, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
121. See S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665
(1990), of Aug. 25, 1990, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
122. See S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/666
(1990), of Sept. 13, 1990, adopted by a vote of 15-0; S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990), of Sept. 16, 1990, adopted by a vote of
15-0; S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/674 (1990), of
Oct. 29, 1990, adopted by a vote of 13-0 (Cuba and Yemen abstained).
123. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/674
(1990).
124. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990), of Nov. 29, 1990, adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Cuba and Yemen), with 1 absten-
tion (China).
125. See id.
126. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991), of Mar. 2, 1991, confirmed the suspension of offensive combat operations, si-
multaneously confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with twelve prior Security
Council resolutions. The Resolution sets out four demands of a military nature and
four demands to restore the status quo, including liability for all losses to Kuwait and
third States as a result of the invasion of Kuwait. See ChristopherJohn Sabec, The Security
Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of
Kuwait, 21 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63 (1991).
127. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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parts, affirms all previous resolutions (necessarily including the
use of force in Resolution 678) excepting the lifting of the sanc-
tions that had applied to Kuwait during Iraqi occupation, thus
all the sanctions already imposed on Iraq remain in force until
full compliance by Iraq is achieved. The Council's decision to
remain seized of the matter provides that it will take, "such fur-
ther steps as may be required for the implementation of the pre-
sent resolution and to secure peace and security in the area," -
hardly a termination of authority to use military force.
Unlike the Second World War, when defeated Germany and
Japan were occupied by the victorious allies, the Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party remained in control of
Iraq and during the ensuing twelve years Iraq repeatedly defied
and deceived the United Nations Security Council, crippling all
efforts to carry out the thorough inspections and monitoring of
facilities decreed by the Security Council in Resolution 687. At
the same time as 687, the Security Council broke the precedent
of Charter Article 2(7), non-interference in domestic affairs, and
ordered the Iraqis to cease attacking its Shi'ite citizens in the
south and its Kurdish citizens in the north, allegedly domestic
affairs.' 21 In Resolution 688, the Council protected the human-
ity and human rights of a Member State's own citizens against
attacks by its sovereign. 129 The resolution condemns Iraqi re-
pression of its own citizens and demands an end to the repres-
sion; there is no time limit on the resolution.
Seventeen months later, another Resolution (Res. 778)
128. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/687
(1991), of Apr. 3, 1991, adopted by a vote of 15-0. This resolution created the United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq ("UNSCOM") to inspect present and future sites
of biological, chemical, and missile capabilities. See id. The nine parts deal with: the
Iraqi-Kuwait borders deployment of UN observer unit to monitor the demilitarized
zone; mandating destruction of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and a Spe-
cial UN Commission to monitor Iraqi compliance; return of Kuwaiti property previously
looted by Iraq; creation of a fund so that the UN Compensation Commission can pay
claims against Iraq; exemption of medicine and food stuffs from the embargo; repatria-
tion of refugee Kuwaitis and prohibition of terrorist organizations. See Nigel D. White &
Robert Cryer, Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat Too Far?, 29 CAL. W.
INT'L. L.J. 243 (1999); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolu-
tion 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
724 (1998).
129. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/688
(1991), of Apr. 5, 1991, adopted by a vote of 10 in favor, 3 opposed (Cuba, Yemen, and
Zimbabwe), and 2 abstentions (China and India).
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dealt with Iraqi assets, those frozen abroad and the receipts from
sales of oil, in order to fund the U.N. Compensation Commis-
sion and the expenses of the United Nations. A further series of
Resolutions dealt with deliberate Iraqi impediments to the weap-
ons inspection activities of the United Nations Special Commis-
sion on Iraq ("UNSCOM").' 3
Iraqi planning to assassinate former President George Her-
bert Walker Bush on a visit to Kuwait produced a U.S. attack on
Iraqi Military Headquarters at Baghdad on June 26, 1993. Fur-
ther U.S. missile attacks on Iraqi air defenses occurred in 1996.
No resolution of the Security Council considered these uses of
military forces, presumably under the authority of S.C. Res. 687
(cease-fire) .131
In November, 1998 Iraqi intransigence on weapons inspec-
tion produced further threats of U.S. military action that the Se-
curity Council sought to head off by a new Resolution, (Res.
1205)132 again recalling all previous resolutions (including 678
and 687) and again acting under Chapter VII, the Council con-
demned Iraq's flagrant violation of Resolution 687 and de-
manded unconditional cooperation with the U.N. inspection,
but, in pitifully weak language the Security Council merely re-
mained actively seized of the matter. This resolution followed
the bombing in August 1998 of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania resulting in U.S. guided missile attacks on Afghani-
stan's Al Qaeda training camps and a Sudan factory, allegedly
self-defensive actions.
Iraq's continued defiance and rejection of Security Council
demands for renewed inspection led to a brief renewal of the
Gulf War when President Clinton ordered another missile attack
on Iraq on December 17, 1998, known as Operation Desert Fox
130. S.C. Res. 778, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3117th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/778
(1992), of Oct. 2, 1992, adopted by a vote of 14-0 (China abstained).
131. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 128.
132. See S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1205 (1998), of Nov. 5, 1998, adopted by a vote of 15-0; see also Michael Matheson et al.,
Symposium, Legal Authority for the Possible Use of Force Against Iraq, 91 Am. Soc'' INT'L L.
PROC. 136 (1998); Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambigu-
ous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraq Inspection Regime, 93 Am. J. INT'L L.
124 (1999). See generally United States v. Usama Bin Laden et al., 92 F. Supp. 2d 189
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (prosecution of Al Qaeda associates accused in the bombing of the
embassies).
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that terminated after four days, but was condemned by Russia,
China, and, unexpectedly, by France.
The year 1999 was a year of difficult negotiations that finally
produced S.C. Res. 1284, approved by only two of the perma-
nent members. 33 The preamble reviewed the eight years of
failed efforts to inspect Iraq's weapons, noted the Anglo-Ameri-
can bargaining chip (continuation of economic sanctions), and
noted the possible restoration of Iraq's oil industry (of interest
to France and Russia).
The principal reason for the Resolution was the creation of
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission ("UNMOVIC") to replace the defunct UNSCOM
created by S.C. Res. 687 in 1991. UNMOVIC was to have "imme-
diate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas
... which they wish to inspect ....
The obvious intention was an inspection system that would
not permit evasion and would demonstrate Iraqi deception, de-
ceit, and defiance in inspections under UNSCOM. This un-
breakable obligation of Iraq was a substitute for the threat of
force.
While the Resolution was not opposed by three permanent
members (Russia, China, and France), they nevertheless ab-
stained, betraying Security Council weakness. To the Iraqis,
these abstentions must have signaled a return to the familiar de-
ceptions and deceits of UNSCOM. To the authors of S.C. Res.
1284, Iraq's failures to comply with UNMOVIC would be an invi-
tation to renew Operation Desert Fox. To the abstainers, UN-
MOVIC's failures would merely reopen another year of negotia-
tion.
The Security Council Resolution closest in time to the 2003
Iraq War is Security Council Resolution 1441,134 which was the
consequence of the failure of UNMOVIC inspections and merits
133. See S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1284 (1999), of Dec. 17, 1999, adopted by a vote of 12-0 with 3 abstentions (China,
France, and Russia).
134. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1441 (2002), of Nov. 8, 2002, adopted by a vote of 15-0; see also Patrick McLain, Settling
the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against
Iraq, 13 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 233 (2003). The changing positions of the European
allies and the permanent members of the Council are reviewed in PHILIP H. GORDON &
JEREMY SHAPIRO, ALLIES AT WAR: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE CRISIS OVER IRAQ 96-154
(2004).
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close inspection. All previous resolutions were recalled, specifi-
cally 678 and 687. S.C. Resolution 678 (authorizing military
force in 1990) is not only renamed but its key words, "all neces-
sary means" to uphold and implement S.C. Resolution 660 are
repeated. This is followed by a repeat recitation of the condi-
tional cease fire resolution (Resolution 687) and its unfulfilled
obligations by Iraq which are detailed. The Security Council
then acts under Chapter VII: to declare Iraq in material breach
of S.C. Resolution 687, but to afford, "a final opportunity," to
comply with the enhanced inspection regime, and to furnish a
complete history of weapons acquisitions. Opinions will differ
about the meaning of "final;" Americans see the end of a pro-
cess, others see a continuing process. The Council concluded
with the threat of "serious consequences" as a result of Iraq's
continued violation of its obligations. Again, opinions will differ;
does the imposition of "serious consequences" differ signifi-
cantly from the use of "all necessary means"? Nevertheless, there
is no mention of the need for another resolution; rather, an am-
biguous reference to a future meeting of the Council without
stating its purpose.
Objections are made that S.C. Res. 1441 never ordered an
attack on Iraq, but the Council has previously ordered the use of
military force by indirection:
1950 "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore interna-
tional peace .... "
1990 "use all necessary means to uphold and implement Se-
curity Council Resolution 660 ......
Precision of language has never been regarded as a necessity in
the Security Council, given the compromises in drafting that are
essential to achieve the consensus of at least nine members with
vetoes by none of the five permanent members. Possibly the
drafters saw distinctions that could not be expressed in English
(or any other modern language).
The problem with the use of Resolution 1441 as the authori-
zation of military force is the ambiguity between the Council's
threats of "final opportunity" and "serious consequences as a re-
sult of its continued violations" on the one hand 35 and the deci-
135. S.C. Res. 1441 states:
Acting under Chapter VII...
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sion, "to convene immediately upon receipt of a report [of Iraq's
deceit and disobedience]." This language seems to imply "no
force yet," but its theatricality is limited by the fact that the Se-
curity Council is always in session in accordance with Article 28
of the Charter and there is no difficulty in convening a Council
session at any time."3 6
There are also textual problems with citation to Resolution
678 because of its reference to Resolution 661 and the latter's
requirement that Iraq be expelled from Kuwait. There is, how-
ever, no explicit limitation on the use of force only to expel Iraq
from Kuwait. There is also the argument that Resolution 687
must have intended to terminate the use of force at the Kuwait-
Iraq border because that is what the military commanders did.
Yet the demands on Iraq never ceased after 687, even though
there was no military occupation. The inconsistencies of Resolu-
tion 1441 verge on incoherence and the resolution might be de-
scribed as the nadir of the U.N. Charter system of international
peace and security because of its ambiguities. Nevertheless, the
series of resolutions from 687 to 1441 clearly imposes obligations
on Iraq on the threat of resuming the war.
VI. SECURITY COUNCIL ACQUIESCENCE: NUNC PRO TUNC?
The Security council reemerged on May 22, 2003, somewhat
uncertain of the future because of the cessation of warfare be-
tween organized armies after only three weeks of battle and ma-
neuver. The war had begun March 20, 2003, with a cruise mis-
sile attack on Baghdad designed to kill Saddam Hussein and his
government. U.S. Army and Marines moved into Iraq simultane-
ously, headed for Baghdad. Uniformed Iraqi forces evaporated,
(2) Decides ... to afford Iraq by this resolution a final opportunity to comply
with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions...
(13) Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that
it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations.
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 419 (2003); see also John Yoo, Agora:
Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict - International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 563 (2003).
136. See U.N. CHARTER art. 28. Art. 28(1) states: "The Security Council shall be so
organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council
shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization."
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so that by April 4, 2003, coalition ground forces surrounded
Baghdad, which they occupied on April 8, 2003.
In the lengthy Resolution 1483,137 of May 22, 2003, the Se-
curity Council noted the acceptance by the United States and
the United Kingdom of the status as "occupying powers" in inter-
national law under the unified command labeled "The Author-
ity," to which other States may contribute personnel, equipment,
and other resources. Twenty-seven action paragraphs under its
Chapter VII authority followed. The Council "calls upon" the
Authority to promote Iraqi welfare through effective administra-
tion of the territory. The Council calls upon "all concerned" to
comply with the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions, fur-
thermore to repatriate Kuwait personnel and property from the
1991 war. The Council then encouraged the United States and
United Kingdom to keep the Council informed of the disarma-
ment of Iraq. The Council also supported a transitional Iraqi
administration leading to a representative government to as-
sume the responsibility of The Authority.
Resolution 1483 requests the Secretary General to appoint a
Special Representative to accomplish a series of nine tasks and
requested the Secretary General to coordinate the approved "Oil
for Food" Program with The Authority.
Resolution 1500138 welcomed the new Iraqi Governing
Council and established an Assistance Mission for Iraq. Five days
later on August 19, 2003, disaster struck the United Nations ef-
fort as the Secretary General's Representative, Sergio Viera de
Mello, was killed along with twenty-two others when a truck
bomb was detonated at U.N. headquarters.
Security Council Resolution 151 113' deplored and con-
demned the loss of innocent lives in terrorist attacks, but called
upon The Authority to return the government to the Iraqi peo-
ple as soon as practicable. In these resolutions, the Security
Council has accommodated itself to the consequences of a war it
did not authorize.
The important point about the cascade of Security Council
137. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483
(2003), of May 22, 2003, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
138. See S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1500 (2003), of Aug. 14, 2003, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
139. See S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg, U.N. Doc S/RES/1511
(2003), of Oct. 16, 2003, adopted by a vote of 15-0.
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Resolutions is that there has never been a U.N. condemnation of
the use of force by the United States, although there has been
no endorsement either.
It may be at last that legal reasoning - especially the inter-
pretation of texts - is inappropriate for the resolution of what is
basically a political problem. Certainly the Security Council is
not a court, and it has long been apparent that statements made
by governments in the Council do not reflect the actual inten-
tions of the governments. It is not inconceivable that a future
Security Council may consider that the 2003 Iraq War was not an
unjust war in terms of the requirements of the United Nations
Charter.
CONCLUSION
This Article is neither a political endorsement of the 2003
Iraq War nor a political denunciation of decision-making at the
highest level. The question is whether international law regu-
lated the outbreak of war by the requirement that it be a just
war.
Despite medieval theories that may have been part of moral
theology rather than international law, it is apparent that the
modern era was only concerned with the outbreak of war in the
formality of a declaration of war before commencement of hos-
tilities. We observed the decline of this formality in the Second
World War and the subsequent operation of the U.N. Charter to
protect international peace and security against illegal force by
non-compliant Nations since 1945. The concluding unresolved
issue is whether the 2003 Iraq War conducted by the United
States and its coalition was a just war in terms of the United Na-
tions Charter. Sufficient ambiguities are now present to impair
an answer free of hesitations.
